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Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, 
Confused Constructs and Reality Checks 
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol* 
This essay, an expansion of remarks delivered at the LatCrit I 
Conference -- the first conference ever convened to discuss and 
explore critical legal thought from a Latina/o perspective -- develops 
a basis for articulating a LatCrit theory. As the introductory 
section, "LatCrit: The Voice for Latina/o Narratives" sets out, 
Latinas/os are a diverse community, whose identity components --
race, sex, ethnicity, language, and sexuality to name a few of the 
pertinent ones -- are indivisible yet diverse and varied. Such 
diversity, to date, has not allowed for a cohesive Latina/o 
theoretical model to be articulated. Rather, it has been the basis of 
skepticism as to whether such a model could exist. The "Culture 
Clashes" section details how, in the context of the majority culture 
in the U.S., such diversity has resulted in a fragmenting of identities 
within each individual depending on external social/political 
contexts. More specifically, "Confused Constructs" reveals that the 
indivisibility of the Latina/o identity components does not easily 
harmonize with the prevalent binary black/white legal paradigm, 
rendering the controlling analytical legal paradigm a vehicle to 
atomize Latinas' /os' indivisible identities. Indeed, the dominant 
construct mis/constructs the Latina/o identity by essentializing it --
thus contributing to the culture clashes within us. The final section 
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Many thanks to 
Kimberly Johns (the best research assistant for which anyone could hope) for her 
outstanding work on this essay. Many personal thanks to Cal W estem for its 
generosity in hosting this truly historic event and in particular to Professors Frank 
Valdes, Laura Padilla, and Gloria Sandrino for their magnificent organizational 
efforts and successes. 
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of the essay, "Reality Checks," proposes that LatCrit's hope is in the 
embracing of a non-essentialist model, one that incorporates the 
notion of the indivisibility of identity components -- a concept 
borrowed from international human rights norms -- and takes a 
global, rather than a parochial, perspective on rights. 
I. LATCRIT: THE VOICE FOR LATINA/0 NARRATIVES 
Not many Latinas/os have been involved in the critical legal 
movements' as critical feminist theorists,2 critical race theorists,3 
1 See e.g .• Symposium, Lawyering in Latina/o Communities: Critical Race 
Theory and Practice, 9(2) LA RAZA L. J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Lawyering] (first 
meeting of Latina/o law professors to discuss critical race theory and Latinas/os); 
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 ( 1993) (review of the entire bibliography 
reveals only seven writers with recognizably Latina/o names, of whom only four 
had specifically focused on the Latina/o experience). 
2 For examples of Latinas/as who have written on critical feminist theory, see 
Elvia Arriola, What's the Big Deal? Women in the New York City Construction 
Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21 (1990); 
Leslie Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1878 (1990); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Women's Rights 
as Human Rights - Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for 
Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 605 (1996) [hereinafter Hernandez-Truyol, 
Women's Rights]; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for 
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender 
Equality in a New South Africa: Human Rights Law and the Intersection of Race 
and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 857 (1996). 
3 For examples of Latinas/as who have written on critical race theory, see 
RICHARD DELGADO, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, (1995); 
Leslie Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1878 (1990); Trina Grillo, Obscuring the Imponance of Race: 
The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-
isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (with Stephanie M. Wildman); Ian F. Haney L6pez, 
WHITE BYLAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); Margaret Montoya, 
Mascaras, Trenzas y Greflas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Personal 
Experience, Latina Heritage, and Legal Socialization, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 
185 ( 1994); Juan Perea Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin " 
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and lesbian/gay (queer) theorists.4 Yet, many of us noticed that 
even the few Latina/o voices engaged in the critical discourse were 
not speaking as Latina/o voices. In lock-step with the oft-criticized 
inclination to atomize our various identities and address one isolated 
identity component at a time, their focus was not Latina/o-ness and 
its conflation with, for example, race, sex, and sexuality. Rather, 
in the general discussion, even in light of the strong critical race 
feminists' intersectionality challenge, 5 the analytical emphasis 
continued to be monocular: disaggregating the legal impact of race 
or sex or sexuality or ethnicity or language in any particular 
situation. 
More and more Latina/o scholars, who recognized Latina/o 
diversity felt increasingly uncomfortable with the pre-fabricated 
boxes into which our views and voices were channeled for 
packaging by the dominant paradigm. This discomfort gave way to 
many private conversations and the notion that we, as legal 
academics working with Latinas/os in other disciplines, should 
explore the viability of LatCrit discourse. Thus, it was quite 
recently that the concept of a LatCrit movement was conceived. 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & M. L. REV. 805 (1994); Michael 
Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The 
Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Loms U. L.J. 425 (1990); 
Gerald Torres Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the 
Hope of Plural Justice - Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging 
Phenomenon, 15 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991). 
4 For examples of authors who have been at the forefront of the queer theory 
movement, see Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: 
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in 
Euro-American Law and Society, 1995 CAL. L. REV. 1, and Elvia R. Arriola, 
Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994). 
5 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L. FORUM 139 
(noting that a blackwoman's position can not be properly understood simply by 
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Just in considering whether to take on the challenge, we knew 
the task would be formidable. For one, the multidimensionality of 
Latinas/os, and the diversity that results, raised the question of 
whether a cohesive, theoretical, pan-ethnic6 model could develop. 
This conference certainly represents in vivo the challenges that the 
notion of pan-ethnicity as the epicenter of a theoretical construct 
presents. On the one hand, pan-ethnicity could be the raison d'etre 
for LatCrit discourse: our common problems are many and together 
we can ensure the power to find a solution.7 On the other hand, 
pan-ethnicity could be the source of mistrust of such a theoretical 
construct' s existence: our differences are many and will impede a 
common perspective from which to launch cohesive discourse. 
Last October, when many Latinas/os in legal education gathered 
at the annual Hispanic National Bar Association ("HNBA") meeting 
in Dorado, Puerto Rico, the birthplace, if you will, of LatCrit, it 
was plainly evident that the venture would be complex. In 
conjunction with the HNBA's meeting, Latina/o law professors and 
some non-Latina/o colleagues held an all-day colloquium on legal 
theory and practice. While we were extraordinarily excited at 
gathering as a group to discuss critical legal theory -- something we 
had never done -- the provocative (some might call them heated) 
discussions throughout the day revealed our extreme diversity and 
multiplicity of perspectives. Before it existed, or was even named, 
the question arose whether a pan-ethnic theoretical construct could 
work. We were Mejicanas/os, Puertorriqueflaslos, Cubanas/os, y 
mas. We were blancas/os, morenas/os; rubias/os, y triguefiaslos; 
algunas/os Ceramos bilingues, otras/os habldbamos solamente 
6 The basis of the concept of Latina/o pan-ethnicity is "the pan-Latino[/a] 
consciousness emerging in this country" conjoined with the realization that 
Lat~/os "must never obscure the uniqueness of the experiences of these various 
Latmo[/a] groups." Angelo Falcon, Viewpoints,· Through the Latin Lens, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 1992, at 106. 
7 The idea of pan-ethnicity is centered on the notion that, in the United States, 
"more brings [Latinas/os] together than separates them within the political 
process." Id. 
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ingles O espanol. 8 
The logistics of the decision on what language to use for this 
first meeting, alone, was emblematic of the panethnicity problems 
Latinas/os confront. The HNBA conference took place in Puerto 
Rico, where both English and Spanish are official languages. 
Although all the law professors who attended spoke English, not all 
-- including not all Latinas/os -- spoke Spanish. Significantly, some 
of our guests, including my aunt and uncle who attended my 
presentation, did not speak English. It is an understatement to 
suggest I was conflicted with respect to what language to use in 
addressing the audience. I was in Puerto Rico where I was raised 
in an extended family setting, where t(a and tfo were like another set 
of parents. Yet, I addressed the audience of which they were part, 
in their country, in a language that they did not understand and that 
was foreign to us as a family. It was disconcerting to know that 
regardless of what language I spoke someone would be left out. In 
the end, I felt that I must speak English so that law faculty 
colleagues -- Latinas/os and non-Latinas/os alike -- would not be 
excluded. However, that choice effectively excluded some of my 
family; I counted on mami and papi to translate for tfa y t(o. 
As this example shows, existing combinations and permutations 
of our identity components place us sometimes together, sometimes 
uncomfortably at odds. Some of us felt invisible, and had the voice 
and forum to say so. Thus started the conversations that prodded us 
to explore further, boldly to go to an undefined, exciting, and 
inspiring place. 
I recall how the name LatCrit was born. The evening after the 
colloquium work was completed some of us gathered at Celina 
Romany's beautiful home en mi viejo San Juan.9 We, as friends 
who live in different cities are prone to do, talked into the late hours 
8 Author's translation: "Some of us were bilingual, others spoke only English 
or Spanish." 
9 Author's translation: "In my old San Juan." "En mi viejo San Juan" is 
actually the title of a beautiful song about old San Juan. 
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about the developments of critical theory over the last decade, and 
about the challenging issues and intersectionalities that became 
apparent in the course of the colloquium. Of course, we were 
engaging in this discussion from a Latina/o perspective and much of 
the discussion centered around the virtual absence from the general 
critical discourse of Latina/o voices, the consequent invisibility and 
silencing of the Latina/o viewpoint -- if such a thing existed, and the 
energizing discussions that we had witnessed emerging from Latinas 
and Latinos engaged in critical legal theory discussions earlier in the 
day. So, we wondered out loud, is there a place for Latina/o 
critical legal discourse? Could such theoretical construct exist in 
light of the diversity of the "defining" perspective? What could it be 
called? We answered the last question that night: the LatCrit 
moniker was "in esse," as we say in Property Law. 10 
With this symposium, we are making history as we start 
exploring the other questions that were raised in San Juan. This is 
the beginning of the raising of Latina/o voices and of the 
integration of those voices into the critical legal discourse. Only 
such inclusion will ensure appropriate Latina/o participation in the 
endeavor to develop, expand, and transform the notion of law as we 
know it. Not that Latinas/os have not been around. A look at the 
symposium authors reveals persons who have been urging change 
for quite some time. Indeed some, like Richard Delgado, have been 
at the forefront of the Critical Race Theory movement since its 
birth. ll 
I posit that LatCrit is necessary because it is different from other 
movements. LatCrit needs to co-exist not replace current discourse. 
LatCrit urges change based upon a perspective provided by 
Latinas' /os' diverse and indivisible identities. And there lies both 
the richness and the challenge of the LatCrit endeavor. 
10 In esse: in being; actually existing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (6th ed. 
1990). 
11 Richard Delgado delivered one of the keynote addresses in this symposium. 
See generally, Lawyering, supra note 1. 
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Perhaps a LatCrit movement is now possible because the 
numbers of Latinas/os in the legal academy have attained a level 
that allow a coalition to form. These numbers, however, show 
more than our potential; they show our diversity and our 
differences. Rather than be disheartened by such facts, and by the 
historical truth of the marginalization of Latinas/os in other critical 
legal discourse, 12 I choose to be energized by them. Indeed, 
Latina/o diversity provides a wonderful opportunity to take Angela 
Harris's challenge and make it incumbent upon LatCrits to learn 
from the past efforts of the Crits, FemCrits, and RaceCrits, 
including their successes and stresses, and build on the knowledge 
of this experience. 13 We need to accentuate the positive, 
particularly now when the patent backlash in our social-political 
environment can appear to put our varying communities -- within 
the Latina/o groups as well as across other communities -- at odds. 14 
The plain truth is that we cannot allow false oppositionality to drive 
a wedge between us, while at the same time we must accept and 
embrace our differences. As Professor Harris urges, we must use 
these apparent tensions as a source of strength -- as points of 
departure for our discursive, progressive, inclusive interaction. 15 
So with these thoughts in mind, I will articulate my nascent vision 
of LatCrit discourse. 
12 See generally Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 1. 
13 See generally Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of 
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) (urging that lessons be learned from 
the tensions arising from modernism to postmodernism theorizing to the benefit 
of critical theory, that we learn to use the high and low points to further 
discourse, and that we engage in an inclusive "jurisprudence of reconstruction" 
that accommodates "difference and identification"). For a discussion of how 
Professor Harris's thesis presents an excellent point from which to launch LatCrit 
theory, see Francisco Valdes, Foreword - La.tinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race 
Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices 
to Possibilities, 9 LARAZA L.J. 1 (1996). 
14 See, e.g., Cal. Prop. 187 (1994) (an anti-immigrant proposal patently aimed 
at Latinas/os but that was supported by the Asian communities in California). 
15 See generally Harris, supra note 13. 
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II. CULTURE CLASHES 
Initially, the notion of culture clashes should not evoke an "us 
versus them" oppositional stance. Rather, it is intended to evoke the 
various, sometimes competing, identities that each person possesses, 
which often, when applying the dominant single-trait paradigm, are 
rendered as competing identities. To be sure, the "competing" 
aspect is not one that redounds, or should redound, to making 
essentialist choices about one's identity. Indeed the tension of 
identities often is contextual. On the one hand there is the varied, 
but self-imposed attribution of identities. In contrast, there are the 
identities that are attributed to the individuals by the group, 
community, or society with which the individual is interacting. 
Culture clashes, thus, result from the Latinas'/os' 
multidimensionality. LatCrit's contribution can lie in transcending 
the concept of varied identities as intersecting and, instead, 
re/visioning our identities as indivisible (and interdependent). We 
cannot choose our identities, nor can we fragment them. Thus, we 
should not let others choose or atomize them for us. 
Although the last comment may appear on its face to contradict 
my starting point of indivisibility, a close analysis reveals it is fully 
cohesive. I, Berta, am Latina. I was born in Cuba, lived in Puerto 
Rico through high school, then came to the U.S. for college. My 
mami y papi both were born in Cuba, as were all my grandparents 
except for my maternal abuelo who was born in Palma de Mallorca 
in the Balearic Islands. Mami is a Cuban trained lawyer and a 
doctor of diplomacy who worked with the Cuban Department of 
State until we left the island in 1960 .16 Papi is an accountant who 
recently retired from banking. My Latinaness is both an ethnic and 
a gender identity; the traits are indivisible. Simply because I stand 
before a community of color does not, and cannot, mean that my 
16. I told my learning story in Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Building 
Bndges - lAtinas and lAtinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and 
Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994). 
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gender, and all the cultural trappings that entails-- both of society as 
a whole and of la comunidad Latina -- disappears. Similarly, my 
ethnicity cannot dissolve when I address a community of Non-Latina 
White (NLa W) women. These identities indivisibly coexist in me, 
along with my sexuality, my class, my ability, my race, and so on. 
It can no longer be, as Professor Valdes has often said, that if he is 
addressing a gay audience he is Latino and if he is addressing an 
audience of color he is gay. The conflation of our multidimensional 
identities always coexists, wherever we go, with whomever we 
interact. And it is the myriad interdependent components of our 
identities that makes us each unique individuals. 
One example about a Latina law student who graduated a couple 
of years ago -- call her Maria -- reveals the potential insidiousness 
of these culture clashes. She once told me the following story about 
her study group (all NLoW law students). On days that she would 
"do" her hair and wear make-up she invariably would get the 
comment: "Gee, Maria, you look Cuban today." She also reported 
that she tended to be called on often in her Criminal Law and 
Evidence classes: whenever a Spanish name cropped up in the case 
name. 
As the example shows, too often others essentialize our 
identities rendering identity construction simply a dynamic between 
the inquirer and the inquired. We are who we are, but too often we 
are de-selved depending on a) where we are: in Puerto Rico or 
Miami I do not "look" so different; b) who is looking at/defining us: 
is it a NLo W looking at me (in which case my gender and ethnicity 
are probably quickly noticed), a NLaW looking at me (where my 
Latinaness might be the salient factor), a Latino looking at me 
(where gender is the deviation from the "norm"), a Latina looking 
at me (where nationality may become an issue); and, c) whether we 
are comporting to alien dress norms: am I wearing something that 
even remotely could resemble a lawyer/law teacher uniform? All 
these factors enter into the internal and external construction of our 
identities. 
Let there be no doubt, there is a huge difference between the 
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construction of my identities at this conference and the construction 
at non-minority committee functions at the American Association of 
Law Schools, or at the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, or even at the HNBA. In fact, the latter will likely result in 
different constructions if it is held in Puerto Rico, Los Angeles, 
New York City, Miami, or Washington, DC. Letting others define 
who we are results in the internalization of confused identity 
constructs, (mis)constructions of identity, or damaging societal fears 
such as racism, sexism, ethnicism, and homophobia to name a 
few. 17 
In the 1994-1995 academic year, while a Visiting Professor at 
Georgetown University Law Center, I taught a course on Latinas 
and Latinos and the Law -- a class that was the setting for a rather 
unique self-(mis)construction story. About four or five weeks into 
the course, the class was analysing issues of multidimensionality: 
the intersection of race, gender, and ethnicity. One student, who 
had been incredibly articulate and insightful in her comments, raised 
her hand to ask a question. I knew it was a question rather than a 
comment because she was wearing a furrowed brow that patently 
conveyed her consternation. I, now expecting some wonderful 
fodder for class discussion, responded with Pavlovian excitement at 
the sight of her hand. Well, I was not quite ready for -- nor could 
I ever have anticipated adequately -- what followed. Rather than her 
usual articulateness, when I called on the student, she started 
atypically stumbling over her words. She tried to start a number of 
sentences, each time punctuating the end of her effort with hands 
thrown up in the air and starting over. Finally, the student, who is 
a Cuban-Chinese woman, just got right to the point. "Ay, Profesora 
Hernandez, me tiene totalmente confandida. Really, you have me 
totally confused." She continued, raising her left arm and pointing 
at her forearm with her right hand's index finger, "All my life I 
17 For a wonderful piece on unconscious internalizing of majority norms, 
cautioning as to possible harm from internalization, see generally Montoya, supra 
note 3. 
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thought I was white. Now I just don't know what I am." This is an 
intriguing identity position. It makes sense if we consider the fact 
that she is Cuban and was raised in Miami thus being "normativa" 
in that context. BUT, this is a Cuban-Chinese woman who in the 
context of "American" society deviates from the normative mold on 
the basis of race, ethnicity and gender. To consider herself "white" 
she had to internalize the majoritarian concepts of normativity .18 
To be successful in deconstructing normativity and 
implementing an indivisibility construct, Latinas/os must first 
confront two important aspects of identity: gender and culture -- two 
components that in both "American" culture and in the cultura 
Latina often are at odds if we look at sex, meaning female, 
inequalities. Elvia Arriola's term "gendered inequality"19 is at its 
quintessential application when we look at general demographics for 
Latinas. Latinas have a lower level of education than non-Latinas 
and are over-represented in the least skilled jobs paying the lowest 
wages.20 In the mid-1980s, 23% of Latina/o families had women as 
heads of the household; of those, over 50% fell below the poverty 
line leading one author to conclude that "Latino[/a] families headed 
by women have the lowest incomes and highest poverty rate of all 
18 These concepts were discussed during the first session at this conference by 
Leslie Espinoza, Max Castro, Rene Nunez, and Laura Gomez, in Plenary Panel 
I: Latina/a Pan-Ethnicity?: Histories and Conditions that Unite and Divide Our 
Communities, published herein as Panel One: Latina/a Identity and Pan-Ethnicity: 
Toward LatCrit Subjectivities, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 175 (1997). See 
generally Montoya, supra note 3. 
19 Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994). 
20 See Judith A. Winston, Mirror Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, 
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 775, 779 n. 20 (1991) (providing statistics regarding the status of 
Latinas). See also Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas I -
Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice: Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 IOWA 
J. OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE (forthcoming 1997) (discussing Latina 
demographics) [hereinafter Hemandez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas]. 
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family types .... "21 These statistics are not disaggregated by race, 
sexuality, or national origin; they include all Latinas, all of whom 
are disadvantaged based simply on their sex, ethnicity and possibly 
language. These are statistics that none of us -- male or female; 
lesbian/gay or straight; Mejicana/o, Cubana!o, Colombianalo, 
Salvadorenalo, or Puertorriquena!o -- can embrace. None of us, 
not one man and not one woman, can afford the Latina invisibility 
that exists. All of us must think of the gender question when we are 
viewing ethnicity just like all of us must think of the ethnicity 
question when we are viewing gender. 
This is a daunting emotional and intellectual task because our 
culture itself relegates Latinas to the private domain of the home 
where public discourse is deemed an invasion of a sacred realm. 
Our communities, however, must be careful not to allow culture to 
be used as a shield to preserve cultural practices that are grounded 
upon sexism and serve to institutionalize and perpetuate gender 
subordination. 22 These practices and pretexts are no more 
acceptable than majority racist and ethnicist practices that are used 
as swords to defile or eviscerate our cultures. 
Moreover, these gendered practices and beliefs are not gender-
bound: both Latinas and Latinos have grown up with socialized 
gendered images, views, and beliefs. Both Latinas and Latinos 
engage in and accept conduct that results in the marginalization and 
invisibility of Latinas. Both Latinas and Latinos must think about 
whether cultural practices are gender subordinating, and take active 
corrective action against those practices that say women are 
subservient, inferior. 
This, too, is a difficult and complex task. I recall, not that long 
ago when I was applying to colleges, my headmaster suggested I 
21 Winston, supra note 20, at 779. See generally Hemandez-Truyol, Las 
Olvidadas, supra note 20. 
22 Certainly, these cultural practices that entrench gender-subordination are not 
limited to Latinas/os. To the contrary, it is, sadly, a global phenomenon. See 
generally Hemandez-Truyol, Women's Rights, supra note 2 (reviewing the reality 
of global gender subordination and proposing a formula for reform). 
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take advantage of Cornell University's early admissions program. 
He wanted me to enroll in a real Ivy league school (mind you, I had 
no clue what this was), not one of the all-women "sister" schools. 
As far as he knew (and that was all the knowledge I had) Cornell 
was the only Ivy league school taking girls. Now I know that he 
was wrong, Yale had started accepting women that year. I was 
happy to fill out one rather than six applications to schools so I said 
"o.k." That weekend I started completing only the Cornell 
application, but proceeded to fill out all six. I did not apply to 
Cornell's early admissions program. On Monday I reported to my 
headmaster what I had done and explained why: early admissions 
was only for boys. "That's absurd," he said, and proceeded to write 
a letter to the office of admissions advising them that I had made a 
mistake and to kindly consider me for early admissions. He got a 
response: early admissions is only for boys. 
I tell this story because I want to give context to my plea for 
gender inclusion and sensitivity. At the time, I had no sense that 
there was anything wrong with the "boys only" rule. It was simply 
the rule; a neutral, objective fact that must have had a reason for 
being. I was totally nonplused; not angry, not inquisitive, nothing. 
I just accepted the norm. I posit that LatCrit, as a gender inclusive 
and sensitive theoretical model, can aid in seeking to prevent such 
passive acceptance of gender inequality as norm or culture. 
With the goal of imbuing LatCrit with gender sensitivity and 
inclusion I am going to point to two specific things. Language is 
one. I am not Latino. I am Latina. The use of male-gendered 
language as the norm that is deemed to encompass the female is no 
more acceptable than to use the term "he" to include "she" -- also 
once upon a time explicated as a "rule. "23 Reviewing the notion of 
gendered "gender neutral" terms one author has noted, "We notice 
23 For the impact of gendered language on legal reasoning see Lucinda M. 
Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature 
of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 887 ( 1989) (noting that 
"[l]anguage matters [ ] [!Jaw matters [ ] [l]egal language matters"). 
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in language as well as in life that the male occupies both the neutral 
and the male position. This is another way of saying that the 
neutrality of objectivity and of maleness are coextensive 
linguistically, whereas women occupy the marked, the gendered, the 
different, the forever-female position. "24 This exclusion is 
particularly felt in gendered languages such as Spanish. 25 
Yet the gendered-language female-exclusion -- what Professor 
MacKinnon refers to as male as norm and as male -- persists in 
Spanish: it is "business as usual" -- explained away by archaic rules 
of grammar that "say so." In this writer's views, then the rules are 
simply wrong. While in Spanish including women might be more 
linguistically cumbersome than adding an "s" in parentheses in front 
of "he", if linguistic cumbersomeness excuses sexism then we might 
as well concede defeat now. Yet, even with increased gender 
awareness this gendered practice persists. For example, I am proud 
and honored that these proceedings will be published in the Harvard 
Latino Law Review; however how onerous would it be to call the 
publication the "Harvard Latina/o Law Review" and include all 
Latinas/os? Is one letter really all that much effort that it is worth 
rendering the most marginalized of groups even more invisible and 
silent? Gendered names mean gendered exclusion which results in 
gendered injustice. 
Another different but related example of culture-based gender 
subordination that continues is the nature and form of the custom of 
women taking their husbands' names. Here are two interesting 
versions I have heard. First, one of my students, a Latino, tells his 
significant other, a feminist non-Latina woman of color, that the 
custom (read: the proper cultural practice) of a woman taking on her 
husband's name is grounded upon a showing of respect. Let us 
24 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 55 (1987). 
25 Of course it is not limited to Spanish, the same problems arise in French. 
<:>ne interesting effect in French is the gendered consequence in human rights 
hterature where, for example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is 
called the Declaration des Droits de l'Homme [emphasis added] (author's 
translation: "Declaration on the Rights of Man j. 
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pause for a moment to consider this proposition. Respect? Whose 
for whom? From whom to whom? And, if as I surmise was the 
case, the Latino was explaining that a wife should take the 
husband's name out of respect, does it not make sense then that the 
husband also ought to take the wife's name out of a similar respect? 
Or is the message here that women, while obligated to show respect 
to the men, simply do not deserve it themselves? Regardless of 
what one's views and personal choices are, to ground (or wed) the 
practice of wife-takes-husband's-name to a notion of respect effects 
culture-wide, culture-bound gender subordination to which not one 
person should accede. 
The other interesting narrative on the "taking the husband's 
name" custom I heard once when I was engaged in a name 
conversation within earshot of my father. Papi piped up, "Mi hija, 
para que tu veas, en Cuba en esa cosa de Los nombres teniamos un 
sistema mejor. Alla, por ejemplo, tu mama no se tenia que cambiar 
su nombre. En vez, ella solo aftadia 'de Hernandez'.'a6 Well, at 
first blush it may appear that this is, indeed, a better system, 
although one might immediately wonder whether the husband would 
also add "de [wife's name]". Distasteful as it would be (and as 
repugnant as the implications are, given the translation that 
follows), at least this option would not be gender-subordinating. 
Rather, it would provide information about someone's notion of 
personhood in the context of matrimony. However, a literal 
translation sheds a totally different light on the topic -- it provides 
a completely changed, and unacceptable, significance to the 
apparently simple addition (and tradition). "De" means "belonging 
to"; de Hernandez means belonging to Hernandez -- a concept of 
ownership that our society rejected with the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Normativity, in all its forms -- be it maleness, whiteness, or 
26 Author's translation: "My daughter [note: that is a literal translation in 
Spanish but it is an endearment as well], you see, in Cuba in this thing about 
names we had a better system. There your mother wouldn't have to change her 
name. Instead, she just would add 'de Hernandez'". 
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straightness -- creates a false sense of universality of what is right, 
desired, and desirable. At one time, this idea was used to support 
racial subordination. 27 Relativity -- cultural contextualization --
compared to the universal, can also negatively affect an identity 
construct for, as shown above, it can be used as a pretext to support 
cultural practices or traditions that effect subordination. Both 
universality and relativity have been used to subjugate women. The 
consequence has befallen Latinas based on sex and race and 
ethnicity. 
Thus, as far as traditional analysis provides, defining identity as 
anything other than multidimensional, results in an essentializing of 
self that I, for one, reject. I am all that I am all of the time. It is 
the conflation of factors that makes me react, feel, think, and 
express the way I do. An integral part of my self is not, cannot, 
and does not become detached simply because of context. Such 
essentializing results in positioning the self as real vis a vis the 
particular selected "ism" which is only a part of the self, rendering 
all the other indivisible parts effectively invisible. Latinas/as are 
the multiplicity of our identities not the fragmentation or 
atomization of them. Audre Lorde expressed a similar sentiment: 
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many 
different ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed 
to racial and sexual freedom from oppression, I find I am 
constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of 
myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing 
or denying the other parts of myself. But this is a 
destructive and fragmenting way to live. My fullest 
concentration of energy is available to me only when I 
integrate all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power 
from particular sources of my living to flow back and forth 
freely through all my different selves, without the 
27 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting a Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to segregation -- "Jim Crow" -- laws). 
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restrictions of externally imposed definition. Only then can 
I bring myself and my energies as a whole to the service of 
those struggles which I embrace as part of my living. 28 
215 
To be sure, an indivisibility approach is a challenge, but it also 
can serve as a coalition-building premise. If we are mindful of our 
myriad indivisible, interdependent identities, we as a people will be 
more sensitive to each other, less likely to marginalize and render 
invisible some in our midst, and be freer to be who we are. 
III. CONFUSED CONSTRUCTS 
Much of the diffusion, conflation, and confusion of identities 
results from the jurisprudential construction of equality. Equality 
theory, one would think, ought to engender liberty; unfortunately, 
its refuge is a jurisprudence of doubt.29 To be sure, equality is one 
of those elusive concepts, difficult to define or articulate in positive 
terms;30 but no doubt we know inequality when we see it.31 Indeed, 
over the course of United States history, the Supreme Court has left 
a checkered trail in its grapplings with the Constitutional mandate 
to provide for "equal protection of the laws."32 Today, the Court 
continues to grapple with, and balk at, the challenges of defining 
28 Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class and Sex: Redefining Difference, in OUT 
THERE: MARGINALIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURES 285 (Russell 
Ferguson et al. eds., 1990). 
29 See Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
844 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt."). 
30 See Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches to 
Child Custody and Same-Sex Relationships, 23 STETSON L. REV. 701, 701-04 
(1994) (describing neutral equality theory, Catharine MacKinnon's women's 
unequality theory, Robin West's hedonic theory, and Margaret Radin' s pragmatic 
theory). 
31 Potter Stewart used these words to explain what pornography that although 
he could not define pornography, he knew it when he saw it. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1 (ratified 1868). 
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and securing real, not virtual, equality. 
The state of legal developments is so replete with confusion and 
inconsistency that it arouses not only doubt but even suspicion. For 
example, courts even have difficulty defining sex. Concepts of sex 
include sex (meaning gender),33 sex (meaning sex),34 and sex 
(meaning sexuality) which depending on whether it is normative 
(meaning heterosexual)35 or not (meaning homosexual)36 can be 
either good or bad. One exception to such binary approach exists 
with sex in the trenches where it all is bad and thus a reason to keep 
all women37 and gay men38 out, so that our boys in uniform can tend 
to the serious business of defending the country. We have seen 
constructs of race, and concepts of hate, religious freedom, and 
establishment of religion manipulated to preserve hegemony, the 
33 See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) 
(holding that state-sponsored nursing school could not deny admission to males 
based solely on their gender under Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that discrimination 
based on gender is subject to Equal Protection Clause scrutiny). 
34 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (sexual 
harassment is sexual discrimination). 
35 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the states could not 
prevent interracial marriage as marriage was a vital personal right); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that marital privacy, in regards to a 
statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives, is within the penumbra of 
constitutional guarantees). 
36 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no 
fundamental privacy right to homosexuality). 
37 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that act requiring 
registration of only men was constitutional, focusing on military needs rather than 
on equity). 
38 An example of this is the "gays in the military" fear that led to the don't ask, 
don't tell, don't pursue ("DADTDP") compromise early in the Clinton presidency. 
Of course, this policy includes lesbians, but interestingly very little was said, 
heard, or seen about lesbians during the DADTDP hearings. Besides, lesbians, 
in wearing the "gender" hat (as opposed to the sex meaning sex [sexuality] hat) are 
excluded from the trenches in all events. See generally Menkel-Meadow infra 
note 40. 
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power status quo. 39 
The Supreme Court is not alone in its attempts to ascertain the 
meaning of true or real equality. For example, feminist scholars 
have grappled with three different approaches to constitutional 
equality: neutral equality, special treatment, and recognizing and 
accommodating differences. 40 A noted scholar suggests that it ought 
to be the subject position that drives the equality concept and thus 
takes a dominance approach to equality which focuses on women's 
subordination -- women's un-equality .41 Still another theoretical 
proposal is the "pragmatic" perspective that suggests that women 
should take whatever approach works.42 Because of the entrenched 
monocular legal approach, however, none of the theoretical 
constructs is fool-proof; all, indeed, are flawed. Take neutral 
equality, for example, in the context of pregnancy. In that view, 
pregnancy -- the unique ability women have to carry and deliver a 
child -- is deemed to be a disability not well suited (indeed, rather 
awkwardly suited) to an equality analysis.43 Only in a confused 
construct can such a capacity, and endowment, result in viewing the 
person/group with the capability as less able or disabled -- in sum, 
39 See, e.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 60 U.S.L.W. 4667 (1992) (ordinance 
prohibiting display of a symbol that arouses anger, alarm or resentment on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender unconstitutional); Doe v. University 
of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. MI 1989) (university policy on 
discrimination and discriminatory harassment, which prohibits stigmatizing or 
victimizing individuals on basis or face, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, etc, unconstitutional); but see 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 Sup. Ct. 2194 (1993) (statute enhancing sentence 
when defendant intentionally selects victim on basis of race constitutional). 
40 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal 
Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 46 (1987). 
The notion of neutral equality, i.e., treating similarly-situated people similarly, 
was first articulated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
41 See MACKINNON, supra note 24. 
42 See Becker, supra note 30, at 701-704 (describing the traditional formal 
equality approach and three alternative strands). 
43 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (denial of disability insurance 
on basis of pregnancy not sex discrimination). 
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unequal. 
The role of normativity is of particular importance in leading to 
such anomalous legal analysis. Any consideration of equality in 
these terms incorporates the "equal to what?" question. The point 
of departure -- the "what" -- is entrenched in traditional legal 
thought -- purportedly objective, rational, and neutral. This "what" 
is then constructed (embellished) around the aspirational, normal 
(but really mythical) "reasonable man" -- the accepted normative 
model. This "reasonable man" was made in the image of the heroic 
"founding fathers," and resulted in a skewed model. This archetype 
of normalcy is gendered (male), racialized (white), ethnicized 
(Western European/Anglo), classed (formally educated and 
propertied), sexualized (heterosexual), religious-based (Judeo-
Christian), and ability-defined (physically and mentally). Each of 
the indicia of normativity becomes part of a rite of passage and each 
individual's divergent traits represents a deviation from the norm, 
a degree of separation from the aspirational paragon, a mark of a 
deficiency or defect. Such deviation from the norm is both a 
symptom of inequality and its justification. 
This static model is anathema to a heterogeneous, democratic, 
and ever-changing society. Thus it is not surprising that the 
unprincipled normative intransigence of this model and its 
concomitant social/cultural/political inertia (of rest, not motion) has 
been subjected to serious challenge. LatCrit, it is my hope and 
vision, will be a forceful, multi-dimensional challenge to the 
hegemonic conservatism (backlash) that normativity has imposed on 
the law. LatCrit will allow for attainable aspirations, not false 
norms, for equality in our heterogeneous society. Two recent 
equality conundrums in the context of which LatCrit can have 
immense impact are the recent erosion of affirmative action 
programs and the new anti-immigration laws. 
Nowhere in our jurisprudence does the issue of equality create 
more polarity than in the area of "affirmative action." Narrowly 
defined, affirmative action consists of race- ethnicity- and even 
' ' sex-based "preferences." The concept, coined in the height of the 
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civil rights era, was intended to make equality a reality for those 
who for essentially the entire history of this country had been 
excluded and marginalized from enjoying the fruits of social, 
technical, employment, and educational progress. The Civil Rights 
Acts, barring discrimination in employment, education, housing, 
and even immigration on the basis of race, sex, color, national 
origin, and religion, were the vehicles that would make the dream 
of equality come true.44 Recently, with the affirmative action 
debate, this dream has become a nightmare.45 
Ironically, although affirmative action takes many forms, the 
only models under attack are those models that grant "preferences" 
(read: unfair advantages) to all persons of color and majority 
women. Sometimes the opposition to these programs take the 
paternalistic view that the programs "stigmatize" those they seek to 
protect. The Hopwoo<f6 decision, with its extensive references to 
Adarand, 41 City of Richmond,48 and Metro Broadcasting49 -- all 
decisions taking away those "unfair preferences" from undeserving 
and less qualified (by normative standards, mind you) minorities5° --
is replete with allusions to how demeaning such preferences are to 
44 See Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq (1994). 
45 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (racial 
preferences in bidding unconstitutional); Texas v. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (5th 
Cir.) (holding racial preferences in law school admissions unconstitutional), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). 
46 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932. 
47 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097. 
48 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding 
racial preferences in bidding unconstitutional). 
49 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (allowing 
racial preferences in issuing licenses met strong dissent from Justices O'Connor, 
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia). Justice Thomas who joined the Court after this 
decision, teamed up with the Metro Broadcasting dissenters to convert that dissent 
into the majority position in Adarand. 
50 Hopwood was a suit brought by white students who, having failed to meet the 
standards set for students, had higher scores than the average for the incoming 
students of Mexican American, Puerto Rican, or African American 
demographics. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932-37. 
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those who are consequently stigmatized by obtaining a seat in law 
school or a job, simply because of their race. 
Paul Rockwell in his article Angry White Guys for Affirmative 
Action51 describes the duplicity of this "stigma" argument. First, he 
notes that "[w]e hear a lot about the so-called stigma of affirmative 
action for minorities and women [and] [w]e are told that affirmative 
action harms the psyches of African-Americans, Latinos[/as], and 
women. "52 Then he unearths the disingenuousness of such an 
assertion. 
It is a strange argument. Veterans are not stigmatized by 
the GI Bill. Europeans are not stigmatized by the Marshall 
Plan. Corporate farmers are not stigmatized by huge water 
giveaways and million-dollar price supports. The citizens of 
Orange County, a Republican stronghold, seeking a bailout 
to cover their bankers' gambling losses, are not holding their 
heads in shame. The $500 billion federal bailout of the 
savings and loan industry, a fiasco of deregulation, is the 
biggest financial set-aside program in U.S. history. Its 
beneficiaries feel no stigma. 
Only when the beneficiaries of affirmative action are 
women and people of color is there a stigma. Where there 
is no racism, or sexism, there is no stigma. 
Affirmative action is already part of the fabric of 
American life. We are all bound together in a vast network 
of affirmative action . . . . 53 
Notwithstanding the patent infirmity of this "stigma" rationale, 
the Supreme Court has embraced it as an appropriate basis to 
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dismantle racial preferences.54 Yet, veterans' preferences55 and 
alumni preference56 remain constitutionally in place. 
The irony of these results is inescapable. For example, in 
Hopwood the court rejected any consideration of race even in 
instances in which, as was the case at the University of Texas, 
historic de jure discrimination had been confessed. The Hopwood 
court plainly stated that "[w]hile the use of race per se is proscribed 
. . . [a] university may properly favor one applicant over another 
because of his[/her] . . . relationship to school alumni. '67 Only in 
a very confused construct of equality can this be considered, as the 
court expressly declared, color-blind.58 How in a system in which, 
because of its conceded discrimination throughout history, the 
alumni body is overwhelmingly racially homogeneous (white), can 
an alumni preference be color-blind? This is as perplexing a 
premise as pregnancy not being sex-relatecf9 and Spanish language 
ability not being national-origin related60 -- two concepts that under 
our neutral jurisprudence have been confirmed as constitutionally 
sound. 
In the name of equality, the Supreme Court now requires color-
blindness -- a concept that declares the constitutional irrelevancy of 
race. I find this an interesting concept at the eve of the twenty-first 
century. Where was this fair and neutral concept of color-blindness 
in the last few illustrious decades, decades during which women and 
54 See Qty of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493 ("[unless [race-based classifications] 
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of 
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.") [ emphasis added]. 
55 See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 
(1979). 
56 See Hopwood, 78 F .3d at 946. 
57 See id. 
58 ld. 
59 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484 (denial of disability insurance on basis of 
pregnancy not sex discrimination). 
60 See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (not equating 
"national origin with the language that one chooses to speak"), cen. denied, 449 
U.S. 1113 (1981). 
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men of color could not speak, could not vote, could not work, could 
not own a home, could not ride in the front of the NLWs buses, go 
to their schools, play on their teams, use their bathrooms, eat at 
their counters, or drink from their water fountains. The eve of the 
twenty-first century is some interesting time to call upon a notion of 
color-blindness. 
It is noteworthy that this chaotic notion of justice is replaying 
itself in the anti-immigrant initiatives. Justice Scalia justifies color-
blindness based upon the notion that we are all simply human beings 
constituting an "American" race.61 At the same time, Congress 
apparently is seeking to re-define the American race. 
Notwithstanding our constitutional provision that "[a]ll persons born 
... in the United States ... are citizens of the United States ... " 
elected Senators and Representatives are contemplating a movement 
that would effectively repeal this constitutional right. The proposal 
would deny citizenship to persons born in the United States if their 
mother is not in the country legally .62 A constitutional amendment 
to deny citizenship to one born in the United States would defile the 
very basis of the foundation of this country as new home for those 
seeking freedom and prosperity in this land of opportunity. 
Nonetheless, federal initiatives, like local counterparts, target 
the presence of so-called "illegal aliens" -- a telling moniker in itself 
as the people are not illegal, although their presence within United 
States borders may well be, and the people are not "alien" they are 
simply foreign nationals -- for wreaking havoc with our economy by 
taking jobs away from deserving Americans (although there is 
ample proof that "they" take jobs that Americans will not perform),63 
61 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
62 There is a resolution before Congress, H.J.R. 88, by Callahan (R-AL), which 
~eeks to ~mend the U.S. Constitution in order to deny citizenship to those born 
m the Uruted States unless at the time of birth a parent is a citizen. H.J .R. 64 by 
Gallegly (R-CA) w~~ld restrict citizenship even further to only those persons with 
mothers who are c1t1zens or legal residents. 
63 ~~e generally Be~a Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in 
Collmon: an International Human Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE 
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by depleting our coffers by virtue of using our health facilities and 
educating their children in our schools (although it is well 
established that the targeted immigrants -- Mejicanas/os, 
Salvadorefias/os, and Guatemaltecas/os who enter California without 
documentation -- every year give more to national, state, and local 
economies than they receive in services),64 and just their general and 
overall criminality, ironically proven by their very undocumented 
entry into and presence within our borders. 
That outsiderness/otherness plays a role in these nativistic trends 
is made patent by a review of how other non-U.S. nationals are 
treated. Lack of papers alone as a symbol of criminality is very 
limited as such documentation is not even necessary for many other 
foreigners to enter into the U.S. legally.65 For example, the visa 
waiver program allows persons who are residents of twenty-two 
selected countries, largely from Western Europe, to stay in the 
United States for up to ninety days simply by purchasing a round-
trip ticket.66 These "undocumenteds" are "significant abusers of the 
system" with the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimating 
they constitute between five and ten percent of the "illegal 
immigrants who overstayed their visas."67 Further, visa overstays 
constitute over fifty percent of the illegal presence in the United 
States.68 With these figures, nativism and xenophobia, and a 
disdain, dislike, and fear of certain others/outsiders are clear 
NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 254 
(Juan Perea ed., NYU Press, 1997)(discussing term "illegal alien" and reviewing 
jobs performed) [hereinafter Hernandez-Truyol, Collision]. 
64 See Michael Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, 
and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217, 227-34 (1994) (citing 
figures that conclude that immigrants contribute $90 billion in taxes while taking 
only $5 billion in social services). 
65 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§1101 et seq. (1994). 
See also, Hernandez-Truyol, Collision, supra note 63, at 255. 
66 See Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 65, §§1101 et seq. 
67 Ashley Dunn, Greeted at Nation's Front Door, Many Visitors Stay on 
Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, at Al, B2. 
68 See, e.g., id. 
224 Harvard Latino Law Review I LatCrit Symposium 
justifications and pretexts for such differential treatments of non-
nationals. However, such differential treatment follows the pattern 
of the confused notions of equality in our jurisprudence. 
IV. REALITY CHECK 
So any self-preserving, if by now admittedly not sane, person 
must ask herself, what difference can LatCrit make? With the 
jurisprudential notions of equality being as chaotic, disconcerting, 
and befuddled as they are, with the Latina/o communities being as 
diverse as they are, is there any possibility, remote or attenuated as 
it may be, that we can go somewhere with this pan-ethnic 
movement? I think so. I hope so. I dream so. 
So there are glitches. If I were to let that bother me I would not 
be able to continue teaching and writing and I would return to the 
safe haven of the practice of law where, as a commercial litigator, 
my soul was seldom at issue. However, the project (and its process) 
is not going to be easy. Al contrario, tenemos un tremendo reto 
frente nosotroslas. Pero unidos, conscientes de, pero aceptando, 
nuestras diferencias y multiples dimensiones, no hay obstaculo que 
no podamos sobreponer. 69 But the foundation must lie on the 
recognition of the indivisibility construct and our acceptance that 
although we may not like, understand, or agree with all our 
neighbors and their issues, well, we have to love them. 
This commitment, of course, is a difficult one, for we must 
commit to asking questions we do not want to ask, hear answers we 
do not want to hear, and embrace people we might be afraid to 
embrace. But if not now when? If not us, who? We have the 
diversity to give us the strength to carry out this challenge. In our 
"us" we can include persons of every size, shape, form, gender, 
sexuality, race, color, religion, class, and ability. We have engaged 
6? To the contrary, we face a tremendous challenge. But together, 
s1mu_It~eou~ly . recognizing and embracing our differences and 
mult1d1mens1onahty, there is no obstacle that we cannot overcome. 
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with our familias for years -- abuelaslos from the "old country," 
whichever one that may be, and hermanas/os from the new one, 
often speaking a different tongue; we have supported each other for 
years, writing tenure letters and reviewing articles; we have fought 
for our causes for years, writing briefs, attending rallies. It is time 
we join our intellectual strengths and make sense out of the 
nonsense that surrounds us calling itself law. 
We have to keep our diversity in the foreground because, and 
some might see this as ironic, that is where our strength lies. Both 
Linda Chavez and Cesar Chavez want to educate our kids. And if 
those two can share a goal, who knows, we might be able to eat 
grapes in the near future. Here are the questions to always ask: The 
ethnicity question what are the implications of a 
practice/action/law to our ethnic group? The gender question -- are 
there particularized implications of the practice/action to Latinas? 
And so, following this pattern we must ask the alienage question; 
the race question; the language question; the sexuality question; the 
class question; the ability question. We have to own up to the 
reality check that we are all those groups. Thus, we have to be 
willing to work together to further ourselves, in spite of ourselves. 
We have to purge ourselves of our internalized racism, sexism, 
heterosexism, classism, ethnicism, elitism. 
I am going to step forward and face the challenge. I will start 
by doing an unpopular thing: I am going to "out" us as imperfect, be 
a little critical of us. This exercise is intended in the constructive 
vein in which Angela Harris has presented the venture: so that we 
can recognize our past successes and stresses and mistakes, learn 
from them, and not repeat them. With respect to our achievements 
as well as our failings let us be neither unduly elated nor foolishly 
self-deprecatory. While we continue to focus on the positive, we 
must not overlook the blunders/exclusions that we effect ourselves, 
probably by virtue of the internalization of that normative hierarchy 
which we then echo, lest we then replicate those mistakes. So I say 
to the Latinos in our midst, do not make Latinas the truly 
"' 111,1 
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olvidadas;10 to the sexual normativos/as, do not marginalize the 
gays and lesbians; to the mas blancas/os11 do not exclude the 
indiaslos, mestizaslos, morenas/os. 
Let us be the first movement that can pride itself in not being 
gender/race/class/religion/sexuality/ethnicity essentialists. We have 
seen what it has done to the Crits. Women's feeling of exclusion 
engendered the FemCrits. Ironically, the FemCrits failed to learn 
from their own exclusion and the movement was overwhelmingly 
racially essentialized. Similarly, persons of color who felt excluded 
from the critical movement formed the RaceCrits who, while more 
inclusive, still felt the strain of the emerging Critical Race 
Feminism. In addition, the RaceCrit discourse so centered in the 
black/white paradigm that it overlooked issues related to ethnicity 
and sexuality. 
One final component that LatCrit discourse should incorporate 
is a global perspective. We should expand our perspective to include 
international human rights protections. At a time of contraction in 
domestic civil rights protections, such norms offer hope with respect 
to many of Latinas' /os' concerns.72 One of the centerpieces of 
international human rights documents is the protection of persons 
(not the narrower class of citizens) from discrimination on the bases 
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.73 Every 
70 Author's translation: "forgotten ones". 
71 Author's translation: "lighter complected persons". 
72 Of course, for the international obligations to apply against the United States, 
it must have acceded to them either by ratification of an instrument or by virtue 
of their existence as customary law. For an explanation of the nature of 
international obligations see generally Hernandez, Collision, supra note 63. 
73 These protections are included in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
("Unive~sal Declaration"), the United Nations Charter ("Charter"), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the Convention 
on ~e. Eli~ination of Racial Discrimination ("Race Convention") (which includes 
ethmc1ty m the definition of race), the Covenant on Social Cultural and 
Economic Rights ("Economic Covenant"), the Convention on the' Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the regional conventions 
Volume 2, Fall 1997 227 
single one of these status protections can be employed by Latinas/os 
to protect persons from our communities. For example, 
international norms expressly protect language, a right absent in our 
national laws. 74 
Moreover, various international instruments protect the rights to 
("European Convention", "American Convention" and "African Convention"), 
numerous other human rights agreements, United Nations declarations and 
resolutions, and myriad conference documents, including the recently held 
international conferences on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993) and Population (Cairo, 
1994), the Social Summit (Copenhagen, 1995), the Women's conference (Beijing, 
1995), and Habitat II (Istanbul, 1996). 
74 See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991); Garcia v. Gloor, 
618 F.2d 264 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
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h alth 1s education, 76 privacy and family, 77 liberty and security of 
e ' . 80 d f d f . . s1 the person, 78 travel, 79 information, an ree om o association. 
75 For example, the Economic Covenant, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, annex to U.N.G.A. 
Res. 2200, at art. 12 (adopted by the U.N.G.A. on Dec. 16, 1966, entered into 
force on Jan. 3, 1976) ("right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health"); Universal Declaration, 
U.N.G.A. Res. 217, Dec. 10, 1948, at art. 25; Women's Convention, U.N.G.A. 
Res. 280, at art. 12 (adopted by the U.N.G.A. on Dec. 18, 1979, entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child ("Children's 
Convention"), G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 49) at 166, U.N. 
Doc. A/44/736 (1989), at art. 24, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) (adopted 
Nov. 20, 1989); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("African 
Charter"), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, at art. 16 (1981), reprintedin2l 
1.L.M. 58 (1982). 
76 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, at art. 26 ("Everyone has the right to 
education"); Economic Covenant, supra note 75, at art. 13; Children's 
Convention, supra note 75, at art. 28; African Charter, supra note 75 • at art. 17; 
Women's Convention, supra note 75, at art. 10; Charter of the Organization of 
American States ("OAS Charter"), 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 13, 
1951, for the United States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, Protocol of 
Amendment, 0.A.S.T.S. No. 1-a, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, entered 
into force Feb. 27, 1970, at art. 47 (states have to ensure effective exercise of 
right to elementary education for school age children); Race Convention, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195, at art. 5 (entered into force Jan. 24, 1994); Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 22, Apr. 22, 1954 (refugees 
to be given same treatment as nationals regarding elementary education). 
77 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, at art. 12; ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
~i.A. Res. 2200, art. 17 (adopted by the U.N.G.A. on Dec. 16, 1996, entered 
mto fore~ Mar. 23, 1976, ratified by the United States June 8, 1992); Children's 
Convention, supra note 75, at art. 16; American Convention of Human Rights 
('American Convention"), 9 I.L.M. 673, art. 111 (1970) (entered into force on 
July 18, 1978); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"), 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, 
~rt. 8, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and 
1;otoco~ No. 8, E.T.S. 118, Nov. 4, 1950 (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1957). 
Umversal Declaration, supra note 75 at art 3· ICCPR supra note 77, at 
art 9 ("Eve · . • · • • 
· ~one has the right to hberty and security of the person ... No one 
s~athll be deprived of his[/her] liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
w1 such procedure b · 76 
. as are esta hshed by law")· Race Convention supra note • 
at art. 5; African Chart ' • . 
er, supra note 75, at art. 6; American Convenuon, supra 
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These protections can all be valuable to Latinas/os in challenging 
xenophobic laws such as the provisions of Proposition 187 that deny 
health, education, and social welfare benefits.82 For example, 
education rights and the right to information would impede 
exclusion of children from schools and the right to privacy would 
appear to shield targeted populations from inquiries when seeking 
health care. 83 
I urge that LatCrits learn from the omissions of the past and 
craft an inclusive, global model where truly all voices have a forum. 
And we should be able to, if anyone can. Those concerns we have 
in common are far greater than the differences that I am certain we 
can, in all events, resolve. To illustrate that our common interests 
are many, allow me to suggest a list of critical issues (in no 
particular order): education, immigration, health care, housing, 
employment, language, voting, crime, domestic violence, welfare 
reform, xenophobia, sexism, racism, heterosexism. That list 
provides enough work on which we all can agree to collaborate and 
furnishes us with a starting point. Significantly, working on the 
catalogued topics merges theory and practice -- because for LatCrit 
note 77, at art. 7; European Convention, supra note 77, at art. 5. 
79 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, at art. 13; ICCPR, supra note 77, at 
art. 13 (though here it is limited to those legally within the territory); Race 
Convention, supra note 76, at art. 5; American Convention, supra note 77, at art. 
22 (though here it is limited to those legally within the territory). 
80 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, at art. 19; ICCPR, supra note 77, at 
art. 19; Race Convention, supra note 76, at art. 5; Children's Convention, supra 
note 75, 13; African Charter, supra note 75, at art. 9; American Convention, 
supra note 77, at art. 13; European Convention, supra note 77, at art. 10. 
81 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, at art, 20; ICCPR, supra note 77, at 
art. 21; Race Convention, supra note 76, at art. 5; Children's Convention, supra 
note 75, at art. 15; African Charter, supra note 75, at art. 10; American 
Convention, supra note 77, at art. 16; European Convention, supra note 77, at 
art. 11. 
82 See generally Hernandez-Truyol, Collision, supra note 64 (discussing 
possible application of international norms to challenge Proposition 187). 
83 Id. 
,,, 
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to have real meaning it must not be purely a theoretical endeavor, 
it must have a practical side that allows us to enrich our 
communities and fulfill their needs, fill the voids. Let us not 
impoverish any in our midst in order that we all can truly be 
enriched. 
Five Axioms in Search of Equality* 
Juan Perea·· 
As scholars we do not want to be criticized for asserting a 
conclusion without axioms and postulates from which the conclusion 
follows. I offer several axioms, therefore, as starting points for 
discussion. I do not presume to be either final or comprehensive. 
I do seek to fuel thought about and discussion of these and other 
axioms necessary to the development of LatCrit studies that move 
us away from the repetition of old arguments and toward a fuller 
realization of equality. 
As I think about the problems of civil rights for Latinos/as, I 
always return to the same questions. Why do we remain invisible 
as Americans? Why is our political voice not commensurate with 
our numbers? Why are our voices unheard at large in articulating 
the meaning and content of civil rights for us? I seek to express 
axioms and ideas that will facilitate recognition of our unique Latina 
and Latino voices and add our voices to the debate on identity in 
America in a significant way. My axioms have unifying themes: the 
pervasiveness of the Black/White binary paradigm of race in 
America; the centrality of Anglocentric premises for full American 
identity; the way these premises silence Latino/a voices. I begin 
with the least controversial axiom, how we might understand 
equality. 
* This title is inspired by and borrowed from Luigi Pirandello's brilliant play 
SIX CHARACTERS IN SEARCH OF AN AUTIIOR. 
** Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. 
